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NOTE
A CALL FOR CHANGE IN INTERCHANGE FEE
REGULATION: EXAMINING THE DURBIN AMENDMENT
DISASTER THROUGH THE LENS OF NACS V. FEDERAL
RESERVE BOARD
Kaitlyn E. Evans'
I. INTRODUCTION
Retailers are responsible for billions of dollars in debit card interchange
fees' each year, but these charges are ultimately passed along to American
consumers.2 In order to reduce costs to consumers and retailers alike,
Congress intervened with the passage of the Durbin Amendment3 to the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.' Congress
addressed the interchange fee issue by authorizing the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve to issue regulations requiring interchange fees be"reasonable and proportional" to the cost incurred by the cardholder's bank
in completing a debit card transaction.' Congress gave the Federal Reserve
Board certain bank costs to consider in establishing the interchange fee
regulations, and prohibited the Board from allowing banks to recover other
specific costs through interchange fees.6 The Federal Reserve Board's final
t Editor-in-Chief, LIBERTYUNIVERSITYLAwREvIEw, Volume 10. J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2016); B.S., Government, Liberty University (2013). I would like to
extend my deepest gratitude to my family and my soon-to-be husband, Zach, for their
unending support and encouragement, without which this work and so many other of life's
pursuits would not have been possible. Additionally, I would like to thank Diane Katz and
James Gattuso, for first sparking my interest in the legislation upon which this Note focuses,
and for proving that banking regulation does not have to be boring.
1. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
2. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394,43397 (July 20, 2011).
3. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a) (2012); Nat'l Ass'n of
Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474, 479-80 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) ("Seeking to correct the market defects that were contributing to high and escalating
fees, Congress passed the Durbin Amendment as part of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The amendment.., modified the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act .... ).
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4).
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rule implementing the Durbin Amendment prohibits banks from recovering
more than twenty-one cents (plus a small ad valorum fee7) per transaction,8
which is less than half the value of the average interchange fee charged before
governmental intervention.9 The final rule also requires that a debit card-
issuing bank not restrict the number of card transaction networks over which
a transaction may be processed."0 However, retailers and merchant groups
are unsatisfied with the regulation and want to see an even greater reduction
in interchange fees. Particularly, these groups argue that in establishing the
final regulations, the Federal Reserve Board considered bank costs that
Congress explicitly excluded from the Board's consideration." Thus, the cost
considerations in the Durbin Amendment have proven to be quite
contentious, and the subject of litigation between merchant groups and the
Federal Reserve Board-litigation that was appealed all the way to the United
States Supreme Court. 2
This Note will examine the effects of the Durbin Amendment and the
Federal Reserve Board's final rules through the lens of National Ass'n of
Convenience Stores v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.'3 Part
II will provide a summary of the debit card system and the interchange fees
critical to the case. Part III will give a detailed discussion of the legislative
history behind the Durbin Amendment and a comprehensive summary of
the Federal Reserve Board's proposed and final rules implementing the
Durbin Amendment. Part IV will discuss the litigation in National Ass'n of
Convenience Stores, including a detailed analysis of the district court's
decision, the D.C. Circuit Court's reversal, and the arguments presented to
the Supreme Court following an unsuccessful appeal. Part V will discuss the
consequences to consumers, merchants, and banks of the Federal Reserve
Board's final rule and the Durbin Amendment generally. Finally, Part VI will
7. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 12 C.F.R. § 235 app. A § 235.3(b) (2014).
8. 12 C.F.R. § 235.3(b).
9. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394, 43397 (July 20, 2011)
(stating that before the Durbin Amendment's implementation, the average interchange fee for
all debit card transactions was 44 cents per transaction).
10. 12 C.F.R. § 235.7(a).
11. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 85, 96 (D.D.C. 2013).
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., (No. 14-200), 2014 WL 4102151; Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, (U.S. Jan.
20, 2015) (No. 14-200).
13. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d 474.
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propose how the ongoing problems surrounding the debit card market
regulation should be addressed.
II. THE DEBIT CARD SYSTEM
A. The Debit Card Industry
Today, an unprecedented volume of debit card transactions occurs every
day in the United States. 4 Despite almost universal use of debit cards in
recent decades, debit cards were first introduced in the late 1960s and early
1970s simply as a means to withdraw cash at automated teller machines
(ATMs). 5 Before debit cards, account holders could only access their bank
accounts by making "in-person withdrawals from human bank tellers" or
issuing paper checks. 16 Within a few years, banks introduced debit cards that
could not only be used to perform banking activities at ATMs, but also
allowed consumers to purchase goods and services directly from retailers and
merchants without cash or checks. 7 "Unlike other payment options, debit
cards allow consumers to pay for goods and services at the point of sale using
cash drawn directly from their bank accounts, and to withdraw and receive
cash back as part of the transaction.""
Due to technological and financial innovations, debit cards have
significantly "eclipsed checks as the most frequently used noncash payment
method." 9 In terms of use frequency, debit cards ranked third among non-
cash payment methods-behind checks and credit cards-in the year 2000.20
Since then, debit card payments have increased more than any other form of
non-cash payment. 2' "[B]y 2009, debit cards ranked first, accounting for 35
percent of the total volume of noncash, retail payments."22 "According to the
2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, debit cards are used for 29.3
[percent] of all transactions and have become the most frequently used
14. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43395.
15. Id.
16. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
17.. M. Pierce Sandwith, Debit Card Interchange Fees and the Durbin Amendment's Small
Bank Exemption, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 223, 225 (2012).
18. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
19. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43395.
20. Fumiko Hayashi, The New Debit Card Regulations: Initial Effects on Networks and
Banks, 2012 FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REv. 79, 81-82 (4th Quarter 2012), available
at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/12q4Hayashi.pdf.
21. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43395.
22. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 82.
2015].
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method of payment, eclipsing cash, credit cards, and checks individually."23
Every year, consumers in the United States swipe their debit cards
approximately 50 billion times-more than 100 million times per day-to
complete transactions worth more than 1.4 trillion dollars.24 In 2009 alone,
debit card transactions generated over 20 billion dollars in fees for banks and
card networks, which subsidized many of their operating costs, including the
cost of offering free checking accounts and producing debit cards.25
Due to the convenience that debit cards offer consumers, it is not
surprising that they are accepted at millions of merchant locations
throughout the United States. 26 However, the massive usage increase in
recent years has changed how banks and merchants are interacting with both
consumers and each other; and the increasing cost to merchants for
processing debit card transactions in the form of bank fees has stirred
controversy, triggering congressional intervention. 27
B. The Mechanics of a Debit Card Transaction
The simplicity that debit card use affords consumers is not reflected in the
behind the scenes processing of debit card transactions. Although most debit
card transactions are processed using what is commonly known as the "four-
party system," five parties actually participate in every debit card
transaction. 28 The five key parties are the cardholder, the cardholder's bank
(the "issuer"), the merchant, the merchant's bank (the "acquirer"), and a card
network.29 The issuer issues a debit card to the cardholder, approves or
declines transactions initiated by the cardholder with a merchant, and debits
23. Patrick C. McGinnis, Misguided Regulation of Interchange Fees: The Consumer Impact
of the Durbin Amendment, 25 LoY. CONSUMERL. REv. 285, 290 (2013) (citing Kevin Foster et
al., The 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice, Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy
Discussion Paper No. 11-1 (April 2011)).
24. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., (No. 14-200), 2014 WL 4102151; see Debit Card Interchange Fees &
Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43395 (noting that in 2009, debit cards were used in 37.5 billion
transactions, but projecting that debit card transactions would total about 50 billion by 2011).
25. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746
F.3d 474,477 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Kathleen A. McConnell, The Durbin Amendment's Interchange
Fee and Network Non-Exclusivity Provisions: Did the Federal Reserve Board Overstep its
Boundaries?, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 627, 651 (2014).
26. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43395 ("Debit cards are
accepted at about 8 million merchant locations in the United States.").
27. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 79.
28. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 477; Hayashi, supra note 20, at 82.
29. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 82.
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the cardholder's account after approval. 0 The acquirer connects "the
merchant to the card network and after approval from the [issuer], credits
the merchant's account for the [transaction]."3 Networks, such as Visa and
MasterCard, build and maintain the payment infrastructure that links all of
the parties to a transaction, so that information is easily transmitted between
the acquiring side of the transaction and the issuing side.32
To ensure that only an authorized cardholder has initiated a transaction,
networks use personal identification number (PIN) transactions or signature
transactions, each of which employs a different method of authentication33
and requires a different infrastructure.34 PIN authentication generally
requires a cardholder to enter his PIN into a terminal, whereas signature
authentication usually requires the cardholder to sign a copy of the purchase
receipt.3 The infrastructure for PIN networks is based on the infrastructure
employed by ATMs, while the infrastructure of signature networks utilizes
the infrastructure of credit card networks.36
Regardless, all debit card transactions are processed in three stages:
authorization, clearance, and settlement.3 The first stage, authorization,
begins when the cardholder offers his debit card to the merchant to tender
payment.3 s As soon as the debit card is swiped, "an electronic authorization
request for a specific dollar amount, along with the cardholder's account
information, is sent from the merchant to the acquirer to the network, which
sends the request to the appropriate [issuer]."" Within seconds, but after
verifying that the cardholder's account has sufficient funds to complete the
transaction and that there is no evidence that the debit card was lost or stolen,
the issuer returns a message to the merchant via the network, either
approving or declining the transaction.40 However, "[e]ven if the issuer
30. McConnell, supra note 25, at 630.
31. Id.
32. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 82.
33. Nat'IAss'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 477-78.
34. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2013).
35. Nat' Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 478.
36. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394, 43395 (July 20, 2011).
37. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 478.
38. Id.
39. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43396.
40. Id.
2015]
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approves the transaction, that transaction still must be cleared and settled
before any money changes hands."41
The second stage, clearance, "constitutes a formal request for payment
sent from the merchant on the network to the issuer."42 Because the
cardholder enters his PIN immediately after swiping his debit card, the
authorization and clearing information for a PIN transaction is carried in a
single message, allowing such transactions to be authorized and cleared
simultaneously.43 Conversely, signature transactions require the merchant to
send a subsequent clearance message to the issuer after the authorization
request, because the cardholder generally signs the receipt only after the
issuer has approved the transaction.44 Although a large majority of debit
cards allow both PIN and signature transactions,4" the difference between
PIN and signature transaction processing explains why certain transactions,
such as those for rentals, hotel accommodations, restaurant meal purchases,
and other transactions where the exact purchase price is not known at the
time of authorization, require signature transaction processing.46 Because of
this distinction, "[iinternet, telephone, and mail-based merchants also
generally do not accept PIN transactions. Of the eight million merchants in
the United States that accept debit cards, the [Federal Reserve] Board
estimates that only one-quarter have the ability to accept PIN transactions."47
Finally, settlement "involves the actual transfer of funds from the issuer to
the acquirer."48 During settlement, the issuer debits the cardholder's account,
and the acquirer credits the merchant for the transaction.49 Rather than settle
41. Nat'lAss'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 478.
42. Id.
43. Id.; Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43395.
44. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 478; Debit Card Interchange Fees &
Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43396.
45. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43395.
46. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 478 ("Car rental companies authorize
transactions at pick-up to ensure that customers have enough money in their accounts to pay
but postpone clearance to allow for the possibility that the guest might damage the vehicle or
return it without a full tank of gas. Hotels authorize transactions at check-in but postpone
clearance to allow for the possibility that the guest might trash the room, order room service,
or abscond with the towels and robes. And sit-down restaurants authorize transactions for the
full amount of the meal but postpone clearance to give diners an opportunity to add a tip.");
Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43395.
47. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 85, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted).
48. Nat'lAss'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 478.
49. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43396.
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each transaction individually, networks calculate and communicate to
acquiring and issuing banks their net debit or credit position at the close of
each day.5" Then settlement is effected for many transactions at once through
a settlement account at a commercial bank or through automated clearing
house transfers.5' If the acquiring bank is also the issuing bank for a particular
transaction, that bank may authorize and settle the transaction in-house.52
C. Debit Card Fees
Throughout the transaction clearing process, the parties charge each other
a variety of fees in order to settle the transaction.53 During settlement, the
acquirer credits the merchant's account the value of the transaction, less the"merchant discount" fee.54 The merchant discount fee is composed of three
different fees-the interchange fee, the network fee, and the processing fee-
each of which is imposed by a different party to the transaction.55 Thus, "[i]n
comparison to a purchase made by check, for which the merchant receives
the full face value, when a consumer pays with her debit card, the merchant
receives less than the full purchase amount."56
1. Interchange Fees
Of the three fees associated with the merchant discount fee, the
interchange fee is the largest cost component.57 For this reason, the network
and processing fees are set in response to the amount of the interchange fee,
making the interchange fee the driving factor in determining the merchant
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Nat' Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 479-80; Debit Card Interchange Fees &
Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43396.
54. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43396.
55. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 85; see Harrison J. McAvoy, Regulation or Competition? The
Durbin Amendment, the Sherman Act, and Intervention in the Card Payment Industry, 37
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 309, 313-14 (2013) ("By way of illustration, a typical electronic payment
transaction might proceed as follows. First, a consumer making a $100 purchase will be
charged $100 by his issuing bank.... in the form of a debit from his account .... Next, the
acquirer will pay the merchant $98 after deducting the merchant discount fee. Of the $2
merchant discount fee, the acquirer might retain [a $0.70 processing fee] and pass on the
remaining $1.30. The card network will receive $0.15 in the form of [network] fees (for
coordinating the transaction), and the issuing bank will receive $1.15 in the form of an
interchange fee.").
56. McConnell, supra note 25, at 632.
57. McAvoy, supra note 55, at 314.
2015]
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discount.58 Although the card networks set interchange fees, interchange fees
are credited to the issuers.59 Card networks "channel[] this fee revenue to
[issuers] as an incentive for the [issuers] to choose that network for their
cards."" Networks are motivated to incentivize issuers to issue their cards to
consumers because the more network cards issued, the more network fees
the card network can collect.61
[The amount of an interchange fee is based on a variety of
different] factors related to characteristics of the transaction,
including the type of card being used .... the type of merchant for
which the card is being used, the transaction volume of the
merchant, and the form of processing (e.g., point-of-sale versus
over the phone, or PIN versus signature). These factors are
believed to both account for the risk associated with accepting
payment from certain types of merchants and provide incentives
to certain merchants to accept a particular card network's cards.62
Interchange fees vary depending on whether a transaction is processed
over a PIN network or a signature network.63 "Historically, PIN debit
interchange fees have been lower than signature debit interchange fees, but
the gap has narrowed over the last 15 years ....64 In 2009, interchange fees
totaled $16.2 billion.65 Networks reported that "[t]he average interchange fee
for signature debit transactions was 56 cents, or 1.53 percent of the average
transaction amount. The average interchange fee for PIN debit transactions
was significantly lower, at 23 cents per transaction, or 0.58 percent of the
average transaction amount. '66 There is disparity in interchange fees based
on the authentication method "because signature transactions are leveraged
on the credit card system, and therefore have interchange fees similar to those
for credit cards. [In contrast], PIN fees are lower because the risk of
nonpayment is virtually nonexistent."67 Thus, prior to congressional
intervention, card networks reported that the overall average interchange fee
58. Id.
59. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 86.
60. Id.
61. McConnell, supra note 25, at 633.
62. McAvoy, supra note 55, at 314.
63. McConnell, supra note 25, at 633.
64. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 86.
65. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394, 43397 (July 20, 2011).
66. Id.
67. McConnell, supra note 25, at 634.
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for "debit card transactions was 44 cents per transaction, or 1.15 percent of
the average transaction amount."6"
2. Merchant Discount
Merchants must pay acquirers a fee, known as the merchant discount, in
order to process a debit card transaction.69 The merchant discount is imposed
by way of a reduction in the value of the transaction credited to the
merchant.7" As previously noted, the merchant discount is composed of
interchange fees, network fees, and processing fees.7 Acquirers and issuers
pay network fees, also known as switch fees, to the network to compensate
the network for its role in processing the transaction.72 Processing fees are
essentially a mark-up charged by the acquirer over and above the amount
necessary to cover the fees charged to the acquirer by the other parties to the
transaction.73 Thus, the acquirer only retains a small percentage of the
merchant discount and passes the remaining amount to the issuer and
network to cover the fees those parties charge the acquirer.74
III. THE DURBIN AMENDMENT AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD'S RULES
A. Legislative History
President Barack Obama signed into law the infamous Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("the Dodd-Frank Act") on July
21, 2010."5 The 2008 United States financial crisis prompted enactment of this
massive overhaul legislation,76 which is the most significant financial
regulatory legislation in the United States since the Great Depression.77 The
Dodd-Frank Act was constructed mainly "[t]o promote the financial stability
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end 'too big to fail', to protect the American taxpayer by
68. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43397.
69. Id. at 43396.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. McAvoy, supra note 55, at 315.
74. Hayashi, supra note 20, at 86.
75. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 293.
76. Id. at 292-93.
77. McAvoy, supra note 55, at 334.
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ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive financial services
practices .... "78
As the Dodd-Frank legislation was moving through Congress, Senator
Richard ("Dick") Durbin took advantage of the "opportunity to implement
regulations regarding bank fees on debit card transactions."79 With a goal of
enhancing transparency, competition, and choice in debit card markets,"°
Senator Durbin introduced an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act on May
12, 2010, the "Durbin Amendment," which directly regulates debit card
transactions. 81 The Durbin Amendment, "which arguably had no place in [a
financial] reform bill meant to avoid a future [recession],"82 passed the
United States Senate on May 13, 2010, the day after its introduction. 3
Because there was no floor discussion or debate on the Durbin Amendment
other than Senator Durbin's own words, 4 this last minute addition passed
along with the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act almost unnoticed. 5 In subsequent
litigation, the D.C. Circuit Court even noted that because "the Durbin
Amendment was crafted in conference committee at the eleventh hour, its
language is confusing and its structure convoluted."8 6
1. Interchange Fee Provision
The Durbin Amendment amends the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
("EFTA") by adding section 920, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2.87 The
modification to EFTA contains two main provisions. The first provision,
EFTA § 920(a)(2), provides that the amount of an interchange fee that an
issuer may receive for processing a debit card transaction shall be "reasonable
and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the
78. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
79. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 294.
80. Letter from Sen. Richard J. Durbin to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2 (Feb. 22, 2011) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/April/20110405/R-1404/R-
1404_022211_67820_571445654740_l.pdf.
81. 156 Cong. Rec. S3588-90 (daily ed. May 12,2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin);
McAvoy, supra note 55, at 334.
82. McAvoy, supra note 55, at 335, n.178.
83. McAvoy, supra note 55, at 334; see 156 Cong. Rec. S3703-05 (daily ed. May 13,2010).
84. McAvoy, supra note 55, at 334; see 156 Cong. Rec. S3703-05 (daily ed. May 13,2010).
85. McAvoy, supra note 55, at 335.
86. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746
F.3d 474, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
87. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394, 43394 (July 20, 2011).
[Vol. 9:559
A CALL FOR CHANGE
transaction. 's8 The statute requires the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (the "Federal Reserve Board") to prescribe regulations
establishing standards to assess whether interchange fees are reasonable and
proportional to debit card transaction costs incurred by issuers." In
determining the appropriate standards, Congress directed the Federal
Reserve Board to "distinguish between the incremental cost incurred by an
issuer for [its role] in the authorization, clearance, and settlement of a
particular electronic debit transaction, which cost shall be considered ....
and other costs incurred by an issuer which are not specific to a particular
electronic debit transaction, which costs shall not be considered."9° In this
regard, "Congress intended to create a closer equivalency between the debit
card system and the checking system in which transactions are regulated to
clear at par."91 According to Senator Durbin,
[t]he legislative intent behind EFTA 920(a) was to place
reasonable constraints on the debit interchange price-setting that
card networks like Visa and MasterCard currently perform on
behalf of all their issuing banks[,] ... [because n]etwork setting of
interchange fees has negative implications for the efficiency of
issuer's card operations and also prevents fee rates from being
tempered by competitive market forces.
2. Network Non-Exclusivity Provision
The second main provision, EFTA § 920(b), the "network non-exclusivity"
provision, directs the Federal Reserve Board to issue regulations prohibiting
issuers and payment card networks from restricting the number of payment
card networks on which an electronic debit transaction may be processed to
one exclusive network (or two or more networks that are affiliated).93
According to Senator Durbin,"[t]he intent behind [the network non-
exclusivity] provision was to inhibit the continued consolidation of the
88. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 920, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o2(a)(2) (2012).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(3)(A).
90. 15 U.S.C. §1693o-2(a)(4)(B)(i)-(ii).
91. Letter from Sen. Richard J. Durbin to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 6 (Feb. 22, 2011) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/201 1/April/20110405/R-1404/R-
1404_022211_67820_571445654740_l.pdf.
92. Id. at 5.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(1)(A).
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dominant debit networks' market power and to ensure competition and
choice in the debit network market."94
B. The Federal Reserve Board's Rules
After the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the Federal Reserve
Board began collecting data from industry participants to determine the costs
associated with a typical debit card transaction in order to promulgate rules
as directed by the Durbin Amendment.9
The Board met with debit card issuers, payment card networks,
merchant acquirers, consumer groups, and industry trade
associations on a number of occasions to discuss a host of issues
including debit transaction processing flows, transaction fee
structures and levels, fraud-prevention activities, fraud losses,
routing restrictions, card-issuing arrangements, and incentive
programs.96
1. The Federal Reserve Board's Proposed Rules
On December 16, 2010, in a live telecast meeting, the Federal Reserve
Board "approved proposing a rule to implement the Durbin Amendment..
.. "' Shortly thereafter, "[o]n December 28,2010, the [Federal Reserve Board]
issued a [notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM"),] implementing the
Durbin Amendment and requesting public comments."'
a. Interchange fee standards
In an effort to "include[] only those costs that are specifically mentioned
for consideration in the statute," the Federal Reserve Board proposed that the
interchange fee standard be "limited to those [costs] associated with
authorization, clearing, and settlement of a transaction."99 Although the
94. Letter from Sen. Richard J. Durbin to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 11 (Feb. 22, 2011) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/SECRS/201 l/April/20110405/R- 1404/R- 1404022211_67820_571445654740l.pdf.
95. Debit Card Interchange & Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81722, 81724 (Dec. 28, 2010).
96. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 85,92 (D.D.C. 2013).
97. Christine Edwards, Jerry Loeser & Jacob Calvani, Implementing the Durbin
Amendment: What was the Fed Thinking?, WINSTON.& STRAWN, LLP (Apr. 2011), available at
http://cdn2.winston.com/images/content/7/8/v2/782.pdf.
98. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 93; see Debit Card Interchange &
Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81722.
99. Debit Card Interchange & Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81734-35.
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statute specifically requires consideration of the "incremental" cost of
authorization, clearance, and settlement of a particular transaction, the Board
never settled on an applicable definition of "incremental.""° Regardless, the
Board proposed that "the interchange fee standard allow for the inclusion of
the per-transaction value of costs that vary with the number of transactions
(i.e., average variable cost) within the reporting period." 1 In the NPRM,
[t]he Board noted that, by focusing on the issuer's variable, per-
transaction [authorization, clearance, and settlement] costs, it was
carrying out Congress's mandate to establish standards to assess
whether an interchange fee is reasonable and proportional to the
cost incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction. 102
Consequently, the Board suggested that network processing fees, fixed
costs, 0 3 overhead costs, cardholder rewards programs, fraud prevention and
fraud losses be excluded from recovery by issuers under the interchange fee
standard because these costs are not attributable to the transaction.1°4 The
Board requested comments on whether it should consider and allow recovery
through interchange fees of transaction costs beyond those related to
authorization, clearance, and settlement, and if so, what other transaction
costs should be considered allowable costs. 105
With these allowable costs in mind, the Federal Reserve Board originally
proposed two alternatives to regulate interchange fee standards." 6 Although
the Board only planned to adopt one alternative, it requested comments on
both proposed alternative standards. 107
The first alternative proposed "an issuer-specific approach combined with
a safe harbor and a cap."108 Under this alternative, an issuer could have
charged and received interchange fees at or below the safe harbor amount, or
based on a determination of its individual allowable costs, up to a specified
100. Id. at 81735.
101. Id.
102. Nat' Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 93.
103. Fixed costs, which are incurred regardless of transaction volume, make it possible for
banks to process debit card transactions. Notably, fixed costs include the cost of equipment,
hardware, and software. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474, 489 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
104. Debit Card Interchange & Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81735, 81760.
105. Id. at 81735.
106. Id. at 81736.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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cap.'09 The safe harbor limit was set at seven cents per transaction, meaning
that any interchange fee charged at seven cents or below would automatically
be in compliance with the regulatory standard, regardless of the issuer's
allowable per-transaction cost."0 The proposed cap on interchange fees was
set at twelve cents per debit card transaction; thus, had the first alternative
proposal been adopted, an issuer could not have received an interchange fee
above the twelve-cent cap regardless of its allowable cost calculation."'
Therefore, an issuer could charge an interchange fee greater than seven cents,
but not more than twelve cents, if it chose to determine its individual
allowable costs. 1' 2
[T]his approach reduces administrative burden [sic] on those
issuers that choose to rely on the safe harbor, rather than
determine their allowable costs, and allows issuers with costs
above the safe harbor to receive an interchange fee directly linked
to their costs, up to the level of the cap. At the same time, for an
issuer with costs below the safe harbor value, this approach
provides a reward for efficient production while also encouraging
cost reductions to maximize the spread between the issuer's costs
and the safe harbor value. 1 3
The second alternative interchange fee standard proposed a stand-alone
cap. "' Under this alternative, an issuer could charge and receive interchange
fees up to the specified cap, regardless of the issuer's actual allowable costs.'
The Federal Reserve Board proposed that as long as an interchange
transaction fee was no greater than twelve cents per transaction, it would be
considered per se reasonable and proportional to the issuer's cost.116
Instead of the Federal Reserve Board proposing standards and factors for
assessing whether a fee is reasonable and proportional to a transaction's cost,
the Board's
staff explained that it chose.., to recommend a simple rate cap in
order to reduce the administrative burden that may come from
having to demonstrate various and multiple categories of costs
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 81738.
113. Id.
114. Id. at81736.
115. Id. at 81738.
116. Id.
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associated with rates assessed. [A] memorandum from the staff to
the Board explains that the administrative burden the staff sought
to avoid is in implementation and enforcement, a burden
seemingly not on issuers, but on the Board and its staff."7
Although most people expected the Federal Reserve Board to propose
standards enabling issuers to recover costs associated with their debit card
programs and a reasonable rate of return, the Board's twelve-cent-per-
transaction cap would have only allowed "[eighty] percent of issuers to
recoup all of their per transaction costs, but not costs such as card production
and distribution, research and development, marketing, responding to
customer inquiries and overhead.""' 8 In other words, while the twelve-cent
cap would have allowed most issuers to recover costs associated with
individual transactions, it would not have allowed any of those issuers to
recover enough revenue to remain in business, and "[twenty] percent of
issuers [would] not even [have been] able to recoup all of their per
transaction costs."'' 9
b. Network exclusivity provisions
The Federal Reserve Board also proposed two alternative approaches to
implement the Durbin Amendment's prohibition against network
exclusivity agreements. The first alternative prohibited issuers and payment
card networks from restricting the number of networks over which an
electronic debit card transaction may be carried to fewer than two
unaffiliated networks. ° The second alternative prohibited issuers and
networks from restricting the number of networks over which electronic
debit transactions may be carried to less than two unaffiliated networks for
each method of authorization. 2' Thus, under the first alterative, it would be
sufficient for an issuer to issue a debit card that could be processed over one
signature-based network and one PIN-based network, provided the networks
are not affiliated. 2 However, under the second alternative, an issuer that
used both signature and PIN-based authorization would have to enable its
debit cards to be processed over two unaffiliated signature-based networks
and two unaffiliated PIN-based netw6rks 23
117. Edwards, supra note 97, at 1.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id.
120. Debit Card Interchange & Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81726.
121. Id. at 81726-27.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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c. Comments received
In response to the proposed regulations issued and their potential
consequences, the Federal Reserve Board received comments from
approximately 11,570 commentators, including trade groups, merchants,
payment card networks, payment processors, individual consumers, and
other interested parties."4 Of these groups, "merchants and groups
representing such merchants hoped the [Board] would lower the maximum
interchange fee cap even lower, [while] payment card networks and issuers
protested the lower cap of twelve cents because of lost revenue and
diminished debit card services."125
Merchants and merchant trade groups overwhelmingly supported the
proposal to limit allowable costs to only the variable costs of authorization,
clearance, and settlement.126 However, issuers and card networks advocated
for the expansion of allowable costs "to include such costs as the payment
guarantee costs, fraud losses, network processing fees, customer service costs,
the costs of rewards, fixed costs, and a return on investment."12 7 Issuers and
card networks noted that the EFTA § 902(a)(4)(B) does not require that
allowable costs be limited to the incremental costs of authorization, clearance,
and settlement of a particular transaction, only that such cost be considered.18
Even Senator Durbin authored a comment letter analyzing the proposed
regulations and supporting certain provisions of the proposed rules. 29 With
respect to allowable costs, Senator Durbin stated:
The Board properly proposes to limit allowable costs to the costs
of authorization, clearance, and settlement .... [T]hese are the
costs Congress deemed appropriate for a debit card network to set
on behalf of its issuers. Thus, the Board's proposed calculation of
incremental costs as average variable cost[s] ... is consistent with
the legislative intent, and the inclusion of other cost[s] in this
124. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394, 43402 (July 20, 2011).
125. Sandwith, supra note 17, at 233.
126. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43424.
127. Id. at 43402.
128. Id. at 43425.
129. See generally Letter from Sen. Richard J. Durbin to Jennifer I. Johnson, Secretary, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Feb. 22, 2011) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/201 1/April/2011 0405/R- 1404/R-
1404_022211_67820_571445654744L1.pdf.
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analysis would be inconsistent with the language and intent of
EFTA Section 920.130
Thus, the Durbin Amendment's namesake sponsor supported the Board's
proposed allowable costs and opposed the inclusion of additional costs
beyond those related to authorization, clearance, and settlement of a specific
transaction in the interchange fee standard.
With respect to the two interchange fee standard alternatives, merchants
and their trade groups supported the first, issuer-specific alternative "arguing
that issuer-specific fees would be a proxy for fees in a competitive issuer
market place and that many covered issuers had per-transaction
authorization, clearance, and settlement costs significantly below the
proposed 12-cent cap."'31 Further, the merchant groups urged the Federal
Reserve Board to lower the cap.132 Issuers and networks, on the other hand,"urged the Board to adopt a more flexible approach to the standards by
prescribing guidelines rather than a cap."'' 33 Given the two alternatives,
issuers generally favored the second, stand-alone cap alternative, but
advocated that the safe harbor level be raised "to a level that permits a'substantial majority' of issuers to avail themselves of it."'34 Like the merchant
groups, Senator Durbin supported the first alternative interchange fee
standard, declaring it to be "more consistent with the legislative intent of
constraining network-established interchange fees to levels that reflect the
incremental authorization, clearance and settlement costs incurred by a
regulated issuer for a particular transaction." 3 ' Although Senator Durbin was
unsure whether the specific safe harbor and cap amounts proposed were
proper, he argued that the first alternative could be deemed "reasonable and
proportional" as contemplated by the amendment, because it offered
standards to consider the average variable costs of authorization, clearance,
and settlement constrained by a maximum fee.'36
In response to the two alternative approaches to implement the network
non-exclusivity provision of the Durbin Amendment, issuers and networks
130. Id. at 7.
131. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43402.
132. Id. Some merchant groups suggested that the Federal Reserve Board drop the cap to
as low as four cents. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Letter from Sen. Richard J. Durbin to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 7 (Feb. 22, 2011) available at http://www.federalreserve
.gov/SECRS/201 1/April/20110405/R-1404/R- 1404_022211_67820_571445654740.j.pdf.
136. Id.
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preferred the first alternative, requiring two unaffiliated networks for
processing without regard to the method of authentication.'37 Merchants
preferred the second alternative because they believed that this alternative
would provide the most routing choices and the most market discipline on
interchange and network fees. 3 In his comment letter, Senator Durbin
described the congressional intent behind the network non-exclusivity
provision stating, "[T]his provision was to inhibit the continued
consolidation of the dominant debit networks' market power and to ensure
competition and choice in the debit network market." 3 9 Senator Durbin
never endorsed either network non-exclusivity provision proposed by the
Board, but rather stressed the importance of prohibiting network exclusivity
arrangements in the final rule in order to enhance competition in the debit
card industry. 4°
2. The Federal Reserve Board's Final Rules
In response to the thousands of comments received, the Federal Reserve
Board drafted a final rule, which was published on July 20, 2011, and went
into effect on October 1 of that year.'
a. The final interchange fee regulation
In adopting a final rule establishing a standard for assessing whether
interchange transaction fees are reasonable and proportional to issuer costs,
the Federal Reserve Board ultimately settled on a modified version of the
second alternative, a stand-alone cap, but raised the cap from twelve cents
per transaction to twenty-one cents per transaction, plus an ad valorem
component of .05 percent of the transaction's value, which corresponds to
the average per-transaction fraud losses of the median issuer.'42 Although the
final interchange fee cap of twenty-one cents per transaction is almost double
the proposed cap, it is still more than half the amount of the average
137. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43403.
138. Id.
139. Letter from Sen. Richard J. Durbin to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 11 (Feb. 22, 2011) available at http://www.federalreserve
.gov/SECRS/201 1/April/20110405/R- 1404/R-1404_022211_67820_571445654740_1.pdf.
140. Id. at 13.
141. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 85,94 (D.D.C. 2013); Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 12 C.F.R. § 235 (2014).
142. 12 C.F.R. § 235.3; Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43422;
McConnell, supra note 25, at 642.
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interchange fee pre-Durbin.'43 The Board justified the increase in allowable
interchange fees
after concluding that the language and purpose of the Durbin
Amendment allow the Board to consider additional costs not
explicitly excluded from consideration by the statute. According
to the Board, [15 U.S.C.] § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B) on the one hand
requires the Board to consider incremental [authorization,
clearance, and settlement] costs incurred by issuers, and on the
other hand prohibits consideration of any issuer costs that are not
specific to a particular transaction; but it is silent with respect to
costs that fall into neither category (e.g., costs specific to a
particular transaction but are not incremental [authorization,
clearance, and settlement] costs). The Board concluded that it had
discretion to consider costs on which the statute is silent. 144
Additionally, based on survey data and comments in response to the
proposed rules, the Board found that issuers incur transaction costs other
than the variable authorization, clearance, and settlement costs originally
proposed as the only allowable costs in the interchange fee, which are
necessary for each electronic debit transaction. 45 As a result, the Federal
Reserve Board's final interchange transaction fee standard considers
authorization, clearance, and settlement costs, as well as "(1) fixed costs
related to processing a particular transaction, such as network connectivity
and software, hardware, equipment, and labor; (2) transaction monitoring
costs; (3) an allowance for fraud losses (the ad valorem component); and (4)
network processing fees." 146
b. The final non-network exclusivity regulation
With respect to network exclusivity, the Federal Reserve Board adopted
the first alternative proposed, requiring that two unaffiliated networks be
available for each debit card, not for each authorization method.1 47
Consequently, issuers are in compliance with the regulation if they have one
payment card network available for signature based transactions and a
143. See Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43397 (stating that the
pre-Durbin average interchange fee was forty-four cents per transaction); Debit Card
Interchange Fees & Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81738 (stating the proposed interchange fee cap
is twelve cents per transaction).
144. Nat'lAss'n of Convenience Stores, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 94-95 (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 95.
146. Id.
147. Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43447.
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second, unaffiliated payment card network available for PIN based
transactions. 14 In finalizing this rule, the Federal Reserve Board concluded
that "[t]he plain language of the statute does not require that there be two
unaffiliated payment card networks available to the merchant for each
method of authentication... [because] the statute does not expressly require
issuers to offer multiple unaffiliated signature and multiple unaffiliated PIN
debit card network choices on each card."1 49
Unsurprisingly, the final interchange transaction fee standards and
network exclusivity provision have "been criticized for seemingly bending to
the card issuers' and banks' lobbying efforts and favoring those parties more
than Congress intended." 5 In a press release issued shortly after the
publication of the Federal Reserve Board's final rule, Senator Durbin
expressed his disapproval of certain aspects of the Board's final rules.' 5'
However, Senator Durbin is not the only one displeased with the Board's final
rule-merchants and retailers, issuers, and networks are all unsatisfied with
the outcome of the Durbin Amendment's implementation.'52
IV. CHALLENGE TO THE FINAL RULE-NACS V. BOARD OF GOVERNORS
Upset by the "nearly doubled ... interchange fee cap (as compared to the
proposed rule) and ... the less restrictive anti-exclusivity option, several
merchant groups, including NACS, the organization formerly known as the
National Association of Convenience Stores, filed suit in district court"'1 3 on
148. Id. at 43446.
149. Id. at 43447.
150. McConnell, supra note 25, at 643.
151. Press Release, Senator Richard J. Durbin, Durbin Statement on the Final Federal Reserve
Rule on Interchange Fees (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom
/press-releases/durbin-statement-on-the-fina-federal-reserve-rules-on-interchange-fees ("I am
disappointed... to see that the Federal Reserve has yielded to the big banks in certain parts of its
final rulemaking. The inflated cap ... that the Fed announced... will unnecessarily take money
out of the pockets of consumers and small businesses and give it to big banks that neither need it
nor deserve it.").
152. Donna Borak & Rob Blackwell, Everybody Hates Interchange Bankers, Retailers Object to
Fed Final Rule, Am. Banker (June 29, 2011, 6:57 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues
/176_125/interchange-fed-final-rule-1039602-1.html; David C. John, Consumers Lose, No One
Happy, With Final Fed Swipe Fee Regulations, Daily Signal (July 5, 2011), http://dailysignal.com
/2011/07/05/consumers-lose-no-one-happy-with-final-fed-swipe-fee-regulations/.
153. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746
F.3d 474,481 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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November 22, 2011, shortly after the Board's final rules went into effect."5 4
The plaintiff merchant groups, consisting of four major trade associations
and two individual retail operators, sued the Federal Reserve Board "seeking
a declaratory judgment that the Final Rule's interchange fee and network
non-exclusivity provisions are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
and otherwise not in accordance with the law." '5 The plaintiffs argued that
in issuing the Final Rule, the Federal Reserve Board unreasonably interpreted
the Durbin Amendment by ignoring congressional intent.'56 Specifically, the
plaintiffs asserted that in establishing "reasonable and proportional"
interchange transaction fee standards, the Federal Reserve Board acted
unreasonably and beyond the limits of its statutory authority because "the
Durbin Amendment limits the [Federal Reserve] Board's consideration of
allowable costs to the 'incremental cost' of authorization, clearance and
settlement of a particular electronic debit transaction" and the Board
included other costs in the fee interchange fee standard.'57 As to the network
exclusivity provisions, the plaintiffs argued that the Federal Reserve Board
"disregarded the plain meaning of the Durbin Amendment and
misconstrued the statute by adopting a network non-exclusivity rule
requiring all debit cards be interoperable with at least two unaffiliated
payment networks, rather than requiring that all debit transactions be able to
run over at least two unaffiliated networks."'5 8
On March 2, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, "arguing
that the Final Rule's interchange transaction fee and network non-exclusivity
regulations should be declared invalid under the Administrative Procedure
Act, because the Board impermissibly implemented the Durbin
Amendment's statutory command and thus exceeded its authority."'5 9 The
Federal Reserve Board filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on April
154. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F.
Supp. 2d 85, 95-96 (D.D.C. 2013).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 96.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) ("To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,
the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; ... (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right .... )).
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13, 2012, asserting that the plaintiffs' claims against the Board lacked merit. 60
In addition to hearing the parties' arguments, the court received amicus
curiae briefs from three other outside parties: "(1) a consortium of major
nationwide bank and credit union trade associations in the United States; (2)
Senator Richard J. Durbin, a member of Congress and the primary author of
the Durbin Amendment; and (2) a group of convenience stores, quick-service
restaurants and specialty coffee shops that operate small business franchises
and licensed stores." 6' Senator Durbin along with the group of convenience
stores, quick-service restaurants, and other small business franchises filed
their briefs in support of the plaintiffs' motion, while the group of various
financial institutions supported neither party.
A. Outcome at the District Level: The Federal Reserve Overstepped its
Statutory Authority
After thorough analysis, Judge Richard J. Leon of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the
plaintiff merchants.162 The court held that the Federal Reserve Board's Final
Rule regarding the interchange transaction fees and the network non-
exclusivity provisions exceeded the Board's statutory authority as granted by
the Durbin Amendment. 63
1. Standard of Review
While evaluating the Federal Reserve Board's final regulations under the
Administrative Procedure Act, Judge Leon properly recognized that "the
Court must set aside agency action that exceeds the agency's statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.""6 In order to determine whether the
Federal Reserve Board overstepped its statutory boundaries when it
implemented the final rules, the court applied the two-step framework
160. Id. (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 96, nn.20-22; see generally Amici Curiae Brief of the Clearing House Ass'n L.L.C.
et al. (No. 22). Amici are The Clearing House Association L.L.C., American Bankers
Association, Consumer Bankers Association, Credit Union National Association, The
Financial Services Roundtable, Independent Community Bankers of America, Mid-Size Bank
Coalition of America, National Association of Federal Credit Unions, and National Bankers
Association. Id. See generally Amicus Curiae Brief of Senator Richard J. Durbin (No. 27);
Amici Curiae Brief of 7-Eleven, Inc., et al. (No. 30). Amici are 7-Eleven, Inc., Auntie Anne's
Inc., Burger King Corporation, CKE Restaurants, Inc., International Dairy Queen, Inc., Jack
in the Box, Inc., Starbucks Corporation, and The Wendy's Company. Id.
162. Nat'lAss'n of Convenience Stores, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
163. Id. at 115-16.
164. Id. at 97 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)).
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analysis developed in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.'65
Under the Chevron analysis, a reviewing court must first determine
whether Congress has directly addressed the specific question at issue.' 66 In
doing so and in deciding "whether the intent of Congress is clear . . . , the
court must exhaust the traditional tools of statutory construction, including
textual analysis, structural analysis, and (when appropriate) legislative
history."'67 If the congressional intent is clear after exhausting these tools of
statutory interpretation, the court, and the relevant administrative agency,
must "give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 16
However, if after utilizing the methods of statutory interpretation, the court
decides that the statute at issue is silent, ambiguous, or unclear on the
contested issue, the court must move on to the second step in the Chevron
analysis. 69 Under this second step, the court is required to defer to any
agency interpretation of the statute, as long as the agency interpretation "is
based on a permissible construction of the statute." 7° An agency's
construction of a statute is presumed to be permissible "unless it is arbitrary
or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute."' 17'
2. The Interchange Fee Regulation is Impermissible
In applying the Chevron standard to the interchange fee standards, the
court properly recognized that if the Durbin Amendment and Congress's
intent for enacting the statute were clear and unambiguous as to the issuer
costs to be considered in the interchange fee standard, the Federal Reserve
Board had no authority to enact interchange fee regulations which
considered costs beyond those expressed by Congress in the Amendment. 172
However, if the court found that the Durbin Amendment was ambiguous or
silent on whether some other issuer costs could be considered in establishing
the interchange fee standards, the Federal Reserve Board was entitled to
clarify those ambiguities and consider and include issuer costs not mentioned
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
171. Id. (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704,
711 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Seeid. at99-110.
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in the statute when establishing the interchange fee standards, provided the
final rule was based on a permissible construction of the statute.'73
Conveniently,'74 as the court put it, the Federal Reserve Board argued that
it was entitled to deference under the Chevron analysis because the Durbin
Amendment was silent and ambiguous "with respect to issuer costs not
explicitly addressed in the statute," "' and their final interchange fee standard
was a reasonable construction of the statute. 76 However, Judge Leon agreed
with the plaintiffs, who argued that the Federal Reserve Board's "interchange
transaction fee standard [was] plainly foreclosed by the text, structure, and
purpose of the Durbin Amendment and [was] arbitrary, capricious, and
contrary to law."' 77 In examining the statutory language, plain text of the
statute, legislators' statements, and legislative history, the court found that
the congressional intent of the Durbin Amendment was clear, and that
Congress intended that only those issuer costs specifically enumerated in the
statute were to be included in the establishment of the interchange
transaction fee standards.7 The courteasily came to the conclusion that the
Durbin Amendment's statutory language and legislative history evidenced
Congress's intent to bifurcate the entire universe of costs associated with
interchange fees-those incremental authorization, clearance, and
settlement costs includable in the interchange transaction fee standards and
all other costs which Congress intended to be excluded from consideration. 179
Thus, according to the court, the Federal Reserve Board's inclusion of other
issuer costs in the final interchange fee standard could not survive scrutiny
under the first step of the Chevron analysis. 80
3. The Network Non-Exclusivity Regulation is Invalid
After employing the Chevron analysis a second time, the court again
agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the Federal Reserve Board's final
rule regarding network non-exclusivity was invalid under the Administrative
Procedure Act.' The plaintiffs contended that the Federal Reserve Board's
determination that the Durbin Amendment required "issuers and networks
173. See id.
174. Id. at 100.
175. Id. at 99.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citation omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 100.
180. Id. at99.
181. Id. at 109.
[Vol. 9:559
A CALL FOR CHANGE
to make available two unaffiliated networks for each debit card, not for each
method of authentication (signature and PIN)" ignored the Durbin
Amendment's language and purpose.1 1 2 The plaintiffs argued that the Durbin
Amendment required issuers to offer merchants a choice between multiple
unaffiliated networks for each transaction, not only for each card. i"3
In employing the first step of the Chevron analysis, the court easily found
that the language of the network non-exclusivity provision of the Durbin
Amendment and the relevant legislative history indicated that "the statute
instruct[ed] the Board to ensure that issuers and networks stop restricting
merchants' ability to route each transaction over different networks."'" Judge
Leon agreed with the plaintiffs that in enacting the Durbin Amendment,
"Congress's focus was on the number of networks over which each
transaction-as opposed to each debit card-can be processed." ' Further,
the court explained, Congress aimed to end network exclusivity agreements
in order to promote merchants' choice, "not restrict that choice or even
preserve the status quo."1 86 Therefore, because Congress's intent was clear
and unambiguous, the court held that the Federal Reserve Board was not
authorized to enact regulations beyond those expressed by the statute and
that in doing so, the Board erred by enacting its network non-exclusivity final
rule, since it was inconsistent with the Durbin Amendment and failed under
the first step of Chevron."7
B. The D.C. Circuit's Ruling: The Federal Reserve's Regulations are
Consistent with the Durbin Amendment
Shortly after the district court's ruling, the Federal Reserve Board appealed
Judge Leon's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.' Just as it had done in the lower court, the Federal
Reserve Board argued that both the final interchange fee rule and the final
network non-exclusivity rule are reasonable constructions of ambiguous
statutory language and are thus permissible under the Administrative
Procedure Act.8 9 The merchant groups maintained that the district court's
182. Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 112.
187. Id.
188. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746
F.3d 474, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
189. Id.
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ruling should be upheld because the court properly applied the Chevron
analysis with respect to the Federal Reserve Board's final rules regarding
interchange fees and network non-exclusivity provisions.'9
Because the District Court reviewed the Federal Reserve Board's
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act, the circuit court
recognized that it had the authority to review the "administrative [agency]
action directly, according no particular deference to the judgment of the
District Court." 91 Therefore, the court applied the two-step Chevron
framework,'92 rather than giving deference to the district court's opinion.' 93
In so doing, Judge David Tatel, writing for the unanimous three-judge
panel, 94 reversed the district court's decision and held that the Federal
Reserve Board's final interchange fee standard and network non-exclusivity
rule were appropriate.'95
1. The Interchange Fee Standard is Proper
In administering the Chevron analysis, the court agreed with the Federal
Reserve Board that the Durbin Amendment contained several instances of
ambiguous language.'96
Recall[ing] that [EFTA] section 920(a)(4)(B)(i) requires the Board
to include 'incremental costs incurred by an issuer for [its role] in
the authorization, clearance, or settlement of a particular
electronic debit transaction,' and that section 920(a)(4)(B)(ii)
prohibits the Board from including 'other costs incurred by an
issuer which are not specific to a particular electronic debit
transaction, 97
the court deferred to the Board's judgment with respect to a third category of
costs. 19 This "third category of costs [are] those that are not 'incremental'
[authorization, clearance, or settlement] costs but are specific to a particular
190. See id. at 483, 493.
191. Id. (quoting In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(d) Rule Litig., 720
F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
192. See supra Part IV.A.1.
193. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 482-83.
194. The D.C. Circuit Court panel consisted of Circuit Judge David S. Tatel and Senior
Circuit Judges Harry T. Edwards and Steven F. Williams. Id. at 477.
195. Id. at 496.
196. Id. at 488.
197. Id. at 483.
198. See id. at 488.
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transaction."199 Regarding this third category of costs, the Board argued that
"it may but need not allow issuers to recover costs falling within this third
category, subject of course to other statutory constraints."2'0 After thorough
analysis, the court held that
[g]iven the Durbin Amendment's ambiguity as to the existence of
a third category of costs, we must defer to the [Federal Reserve]
Board's reasonable determination that the statute splits costs into
three categories: (1) incremental [authorization, clearance, and
settlement] costs, which the Board must allow issuers to recover;
(2) costs specific to a particular transaction, other than
incremental [authorization, clearance, or settlement] costs, which
the Board may, but need not, allow issuers to recover; and (3) costs
not specific to a particular transaction, which the Board may not
allow issuers to recover.20'
Because the court held that the "Board reasonably interpreted the Durbin
Amendment as allowing issuers to recover some costs in addition to
incremental [authorization, settlement, and clearance] costs," the court
considered "whether the Board reasonably concluded that issuers can recover
the four specific types of costs the merchants challenge[d]: 'fixed'
[authorization, clearance, and settlement] costs, network processing fees,
fraud losses, and transactions-monitoring .costs." 2°2 In making this
determination, the court likened the Board's inclusion of these costs to
agency ratemaking, noting that "whether issuers or merchants should bear
certain costs is 'far from an exact science and involves policy determinations
in which the [Board] is acknowledged to have expertise.' 2 3 The court
recognized that in the agency ratemaking area, judicial review is "particularly
deferential, as the Board is the expert body Congress has designated to weigh
the many factors at issue when assessing whether a rate is just and
reasonable." 24
The merchant-appellees argued that fixed costs, which the court identified
as those costs that issuers incur regardless of the transaction volume, as
opposed to variable costs which increase with the transaction volume, are,
"[b]y definition, . not 'specific' to any 'particular' transaction and fall
199. Id. at 483.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 488.
202. Id. at 489.
203. Id. (quoting Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151,163 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
204. Id. (quoting Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
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squarely within the statute's excludable costs provision."205 However, the
court sided with the Board, stating that the Board's decision to interpret the
statute as not preventing the recovery of fixed costs was reasonable because
"the Board interpreted [EFTA] section 920(a)(4)(B) as allowing issuers to
recover costs they must incur in order to effectuate particular electronic debit
card transactions but precluding them from recovering other costs too
remote from the processing of actual transactions." 26 In other words, "the
Board reasonably distinguished between costs issuers could recover and
those they could not recover on the basis of whether those costs are 'incurred
in the course of effecting' transactions."2 7 Focusing on this deferential
treatment, the court reviewed each of the four costs at issue in turn.08
Although the merchant-appellees argued that "allowing issuers to recover
network processing fees through the interchange fee would [be inconsistent
with] section 920(a)(8)(B), which requires the Board to ensure that 'a
network fee is not used to directly or indirectly compensate an issuer with
respect to an electronic debit transaction,"' the court easily found that
"[n]etwork processing fees, which issuers pay on a per-transaction basis,
[and] are.., specific to particular transactions," were properly considered in
establishing the interchange fee standard. 09 Contrary to the merchant-
appellees' argument, the court noted that "section 920(a)(8)(B) is designed to
prevent issuers and networks from circumventing the Board's interchange
fee rules, not to prevent issuers from recovering reasonable network
processing fees through the interchange fee."210
The court held that the Federal Reserve Board had discretion to include
the cost of fraud losses to issuers in the interchange fee standard even though
a separate, "fraud-prevention adjustment [provision], which allows issuers to
recover fraud-prevention costs if those issuers comply with the Board's
fraud-prevention standards," is in the statute.21' The Board determined, and
the court agreed, that fraud loss costs could be included in the interchange
fee standard rather than in the fraud prevention adjustment "because fraud
losses result from the failure of fraud-prevention, they do not themselves
qualify as fraud-prevention costs." 212
205. Id.
206. Id. at 490.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 489-93.
209. Id. at 490-91.
210. Id. at 491.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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Finally, regarding transactions-monitoring costs, "the paradigmatic
example of fraud-prevention costs," the Board
distinguished between '[t]ransactions monitoring systems [that]
assist in the authorization process by providing information to the
issuer before the issuer decides to approve or decline the
transaction,' which the Board placed outside the fraud-prevention
adjustment, and 'fraud-prevention activities,.. . that prevent fraud
with respect to transactions at times other than when the issuer is
effecting the transaction'-for instance the cost of sending'cardholder alerts ... inquir[ing] about suspicious activity'-
which the Board determined should be 'considered in connection
with the fraud-prevention adjustment.'213
Because the court "agree[d] with the Board that transactions-monitoring
costs can reasonably qualify both as costs 'specific to a particular ...
transaction' (section 920(a)(4)(B)) and as fraud-prevention costs (section
920(a)(5)),"2 14 the Court concluded that the Board might have authority to
allow issuers to recover transaction-monitoring costs via interchange fees
regardless of whether those issuers fall in compliance with the fraud-
prevention standards.21 5 However, the court remanded this aspect of the
ruling back to the Federal Reserve Board for explanation because the Board
failed to explain why it exercised its discretion in this manner.2 6
After administering the two-step Chevron analysis to determine whether
the Federal Reserve Board's rulemaking complied with the Administrative
Procedure Act, the court held that due to ambiguities in the Durbin
Amendment's statutory language, deference was properly given to the Board
213. Id. at 492 (quoting Debit Card Interchange Fees & Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394,
43430-31 (July 20, 2011)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. The Federal Reserve Board failed to meet the standard described in Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), which requires
"an agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner." Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 48. The Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores court noted that the
Board likely had "a reasonable justification for determining that transactions-monitoring costs
properly fall outside the fraud-prevention adjustment," however, the Board has not yet
articulated such a justification. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 493. According
to the Supreme Court, "[i]f the record before the agency does not support the agency action,
if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot
evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the proper course,
except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation." Id. (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Loion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)).
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to resolve the ambiguities based on a reasonable construction of the statute.1 7
Thus, the court examined whether the Board's inclusion of the costs at issue
in the interchange fee final rule was reasonable. The court determined that,
based on the construction of the statute, the Board had reasonably
interpreted the ambiguous statute by including the third category of costs in
its final rule.21" Therefore, the circuit court overruled the district court,
holding that the twenty-one cent cap on interchange fees is permissible under
the Durbin Amendment.
2. The Network Non-Exclusivity Regulation is Valid
With respect to the Federal Reserve Board's network non-exclusivity iule,
which requires issuers and networks to offer at least two unaffiliated
networks for each debit card rather than each method of authentication, the
court deferred to the Federal Reserve Board's statutory interpretation. 9 The
court quickly recognized that "Congress directed the Board to issue rules that
would accomplish a particular objective, leaving it to the Board to decide how
best to do so, and the Board's rule seems to comply perfectly with Congress's
command. 220
The Board and the merchant groups agree that Congress's intent in
enacting the network non-exclusivity provision of the Durbin Amendment
was to increase competition among networks in order to drive down network
processing fees.22' While the merchants argued that requiring two
unaffiliated networks for each debit transaction would increase competition
among networks, thereby fulfilling Congress's wishes, the Board presented"evidence demonstrating that its rule has, as predicted, substantially
increased network competition.."222 Therefore, the court reasoned that
"[g]iven that the Board's rule advances the Durbin Amendment's purpose,
we decline to second-guess its reasoned decision to reject an alternative
option that might have further advanced that purpose."223
217. Nat'lAss'n of Convenience Stores, 746 F.3d at 488.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 492, 496.
220. Id. at 494.
221. See id. at 494-95.
222. Id. at 495. "According to the Board, as a result of the rule over 100 million debit cards
were activated on new networks, and '[Visa], which had previously accounted for
approximately 50-60% of the [PIN debit] market, lost roughly half that share."' Id. (quoting
Appellant's Br. 37 & n.6).
223. Id.
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C. Appeal to the Supreme Court
Undeterred by the circuit court's decision, the NACS and the other
merchant groups filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court on August 18, 2014.224 The merchants urged the Supreme
Court to take up this case due to the importance of the final rule and the
gravity of the circuit court's "legal error in upholding an agency rule that has
multi-billion-dollar consequences for milliohs of parties every year. '225 The
merchants warned that if allowed to stand, the final "rule will unlawfully
permit banks to inflate by billions of dollars each year the interchange fees
they charge American merchants, and in turn, American consumers."226
Along with their usual arguments supporting the contention that the
Federal Reserve Board overstepped its statutory boundaries when it finalized
the larger interchange fee cap, and the more restrictive non-exclusivity rule,
the merchants' petition for writ argued that the D.C. Circuit committed a
significant legal error in deferring to the Board's authority. 27 According to
the merchants, the Circuit Court's reasoning that the Durbin Amendment
allows the Board to engage in the equivalent of ratemaking is flawed for
several reasons. 221 Particularly, the merchant-petitioners contend that by
considering the Board's action a "ratemaking"-something the Board itself
rejected-the court granted the Board far greater discretion than it was
due.229 The merchant-petitioners also found fault with the circuit court's
application of Chevron, arguing that the court was wrong to defer to the
Board's judgment since the Durbin Amendment is unambiguously clear and
the Board's final rule was "quite simply, incoherent," and did not reflect
Congress's obvious intent.20
In response, the Federal Reserve Board urged the Supreme Court to pass
on hearing the case because it argued that the court of appeals correctly
rejected the merchant-petitioners' arguments.23' Noting that nothing in the
224. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-200), 2014 WL 4102151 (U.S.)
(Aug. 18, 2014).
225. Id. at 17.
226. Id. at 18.
227. Id. at 17.
228. Id. at 24-32.
229. Id. at 24.
230. Id. at 26-27.
231. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-200), 2014 WL
6478964 (U.S.) (Nov. 19, 2014).
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statute forbids the recovery of the costs at issue in the interchange fee, the
Board argued that the inclusion of these costs in the final interchange fee
standard was not in violation of the Chevron rule.232 In direct response to the
petitioners' argument, the Board argued that, because the regulations are
consistent with Chevron without having to appeal to a higher deferential
standard, the fact that the court of appeals alluded to ratemaking is irrelevant
and does not require Supreme Court intervention.233
In addition to the briefs filed by the parties, several interested outside
parties filed amicus curiae briefs encouraging the Supreme Court to act in
compliance with their interests. 3 Senator Durbin, the primary sponsor
behind the Durbin Amendment, filed a brief in support of the petitioners
discussing the congressional intent behind the Amendment and the effects
Congress intended it to have on the debit card industry.235 Durbin's brief
argued that his namesake amendment was carefully authored to respond to
the failures of the interchange fee system.236 Relevant to this litigation, Durbin
noted that Congress specifically limited the Board's cost considerations to the
incremental cost of authorization, clearance, and settlement because
Congress identified those as the core costs of conducting a debit transaction
and hoped that by only allowing interchange fee recovery of these limited
costs, card issuers would be incentivized to manage their operations more
effectively, thus reducing consumer costs. 237 Durbin argued that Congress's
mandate to the Board was clear through the statutory language and legislative
intent, and that the Board's final rule was invalid because it ignored all
congressional directives.238
232. Id. at 13-14.
233. Id. at 21.
234. See generally Brief for Ahold, U.S.A., Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 14-200
(2014), 2014 WL 4730626; Brief for 7-Eleven, Inc., Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc., Brookshire
Grocery Co., CKE Restaurants Holdings, Inc., Starbucks Corp., and Wendy's Co. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 14-200 (2014), 2014 WL 4730628; Brief for Retail Litigation Center, Inc.
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 14-200 (2014), 2014 WL 4730629; Brief for Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 14-200 (2014), 2014 WL 4730630.
235. Brief for U.S. Sen. Richard J. Durbin as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4-
14, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 14-200
(2014), 2014 WL 4704636.
236. Id. at 4-7.
237. Id. at 10-11.
238. Id.at 11.
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Senator Durbin was not the only one lining up behind the merchant-
petitioners begging the Supreme Court to take up this case. Retail giants such
as Wal-Mart, 7-Eleven, and Starbucks also submitted amicus briefs in
support of the petitioners, arguing that the high interchange fee standards
cost them millions of dollars each year.239 These retailers argued that they
have no choice but to pay the unreasonably high interchange fees because
they have to accept one of the most common forms of payment-debit
cards-in order to stay in business.2
Interestingly enough, no banking groups or financial institutions filed
amicus curiae briefs with the Supreme Court, even though those groups were
quick to file briefs when the case was before the circuit court.24' The banking
groups filed their brief in support of neither party, arguing that the district
court was wrong in holding that costs that are specific to particular debit card
transactions, but that are not incremental authorization, clearance, and
settlement costs, could not be considered by the Board in its rulemaking.242
However, the financial groups did not file their brief in support of the Federal
Reserve Board because they argued that while the Board's final rule was an
improvement on their proposed rule, the regulations still did not allow for
banks to recover all their costs or a reasonable rate of return, both of which,
they argued, the Durbin Amendment allows.243
Despite the pleas of petitioners, retailers, and merchant groups, the
Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to hear this case. 2' The Supreme
239. Brief for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Nat'l
Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., No. 14-200 (2014),
2014 WL 4730630; Brief for 7-Eleven, Inc., Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc., Brookshire Grocery
Co., CKE Restaurants Holdings, Inc., Starbucks Corp., and Wendy's Co. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Sys., No. 14-200 (2014), 2014 WL 4730628.
240. Brief for 7-Eleven, Inc., Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc., Brookshire Grocery Co., CKE
Restaurants Holdings, Inc., Starbucks Corp., & Wendy's Co. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys.,
No. 14-200 (2014), 2014 WL 4730628.
241. See Brief for Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., Am. Bankers Ass'n, Consumer Bankers
Ass'n, Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n, The Fin. Serve. Roundtable, Indep. Comty. Bankers of Am.,
Mid-Size Bank Coal. of Am., Nat'l Ass'n of Fed. Credit Unions, & Nat'l Bankers Ass'n as Amici
Curiae Supporting Neither Party and Reversal, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-200), 2013 WL
5720157.
242. Id. at 9.
243. Id. at 2.
244. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746
F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 2015 WL 231974 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2015) (No. 14-200).
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Court's decision to deny certiorari in this case allows the D.C. Circuit Court's
opinion to stand. Thus, the Federal Reserve Board's final rules-which cap
interchange fees at twenty-one cents and require two unaffiliated networks
to be available for each debit card-are the law of the land.245
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT AND THE
BOARD'S FINAL RULE
Because the Supreme Court decided not to intervene in this case, it is clear
from the already-present consequences of the Federal Reserve Board's final
rule that if Congress does not take action, the rule will take its toll on the
economy. Although Congress tacked the Durbin Amendment onto the
Dodd-Frank Act assuming that it would ultimately reduce consumer costs by
offering relief from high interchange fees, 246  "two years after
implementation-Congress's assumptions have proven to be wrong, with
most consumers having received little to no benefit at all." 247
Durbin Amendment advocates logically believed that regulation of
interchange fees would cause a reduction in merchant costs-a reduction
that would eventually be .passed to consumers.24' However, several other
countries have attempted to regulate interchange fees by imposing cap
limitations, but in none of these countries have consumers experienced
corresponding savings, and the United States has proven to follow a similar
trajectory.249 For example, in the United States, gas retailers, who attribute
one third of their sale transactions to debit card users, have "received over $1
billion in annual savings due to reduced interchange fees. '20 If the blissful
theory that merchants will pass on their interchange fee savings to consumers
were accurate, consumers should have seen a savings of about three cents per
gallon, although no such price reduction has been realized.2"'
Further, American consumers are paying for reduced interchange fees in
the form of higher prices for other banking services. As banks look to recoup
their lost interchange fee revenue in creative ways, "Jamie Dimon, the
president and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, compared how banks will respond
245. See id. at 488, 496.
246. 156 Cong. Rec. S3695 (daily ed. May 13, 2010).
247. McConnell, supra note 25, at 655.
248. David C. John, The Durbin Debit Card Interchange Fee Hurts Consumers, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/debit-card-
changes-how-the-durbin-interchange-fee-hurts-consumers.
249. McConnell, supra note 25, at 654.
250. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 296.
251. Id. at 296-97.
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to the Durbin Amendment to how a restaurant would deal with a similar
situation [by explaining,] 'if you're a restaurant and you cannot charge for
the soda, you're going to charge [more] for the burger. Over time, it will all
be repriced [sic] into the business.' 25 2 Unsurprisingly, the banks agreed with
Dimon according to a study that shows a sharp decline in the number of
banks offering free checking accounts from 2009 to 2012.253 In 2012, only
thirty-nine percent of banks offered free checking accounts, a sharp decline
from the seventy-six percent of banks that offered free checking before the
birth of the Durbin Amendment.254 In analyzing the years surrounding the
passage of the Durbin Amendment, the study found an overall increase in
almost every banking service fee considered, including monthly maintenance
fees, ATM withdrawal fees, and overdraft fees in 2012-just one year after
the Federal Reserve Board's final rule was published.255' In fact, "[i]t is
estimated that consumers will lose '$22 to $25 billion more per year from
higher bank fees and reduced services than they are expected to gain from
lower merchant prices and better merchant services' as a result of the
interchange fee regulation.256
Like consumers, small businesses and merchants, the other intended
beneficiaries of the Durbin Amendment, 25 7 have not received any relief since
the statute's implementation. Before Congress passed the Durbin
Amendment, issuers offered discounted fees to merchants who sold low-
priced goods; but in an effort to recover lost revenue due to the interchange
fee cap, issuers have largely eliminated this practice and charge all merchants
the maximum interchange fee allowed, regardless of transaction value.2" As
a result, many businesses that deal in low-priced goods are required to pay
even higher interchange fees than they did before issuance of the cap.259 For
252. Id. at 299 (citing Anthony Randazzo, Durbin Amendment Swipe Fee Watch III. Bank
of America Debit Card Fees, REASON FOUND. BLOG (Oct. 23, 2011, 8:52 AM), available at
http://reason.org/bloglshow/durbin-swipe-fee-watch-iii-bofa).
253. Claes Bell, Checking Fees Rise to Record Highs in 2012, BANKRATE.COM (Sept. 24, 2012),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/checking/checking-fees-record-highs-in-2012.aspx#slide=1.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. McConnell, supra note 25, at 655 (quoting David S. Evans et al., The Impact of the U.S.
Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare: An Event Study Analysis 48
(Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 658)).
257. 156 Cong. Rec. S3695 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin)
("This amendment will help small businesses, merchants, and consumers by providing relief
from high interchange fees for debit card transactions.").
258. McConnell, supra note 25, at 656.
259. Id.
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example, Redbox, a company that issues movie and game rentals to
customers from vending machine kiosks, upped the price of a one-day rental
from $1.00 to $1.20, ascribing the price increase to increased debit card
fees. 260
VI. CONCLUSION
As the circuit court recognized, "neither agencies nor courts have the
authority to disregard the demands of even poorly drafted legislation." 26' This
truth is the issue at the heart of this case. Arguably, because of Judge Leon's
strict interpretation of the Durbin Amendment, his decision invalidating the
Federal Reserve Board's final rules was correct, 262 but had the judiciary sent
the Federal Reserve Board back to the drawing board with specific
instructions to not consider the controversial third category of costs, the
dismal consequences of the current regulation would only be amplified.2 63
However, because the court deferred to the Board's judgment under Chevron,
and upheld the final rules regarding interchange fees and network exclusivity,
everyone was left unhappy;264 and consumers, retailers, and financial
institutions have continued to suffer.265 Even Ben Bernanke, chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board at the time the final regulations were issued,
recognized the possible side effects of such drastic regulations and had
concerns about their implementation, but "made the excuse that 'this is the
260. McGinnis, supra note 23, at 298; McConnell, supra note 25, at 656.
261. Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746
F.3d 474,483 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
262. See Kevin Wack, Damage to Banks from Debit Card Ruling Goes Beyond Lower Fee
Cap, AM. BANKER (Aug. 13, 2013, 12:29 PM),
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/1 78_156/damage-to-banks-from-debit-card-ruling-
goes-beyond-lower-fee-cap-1061295-1 .html.
263. See generally Diane Katz, Bernanke on Dodd-Frank Fallout: Debit Card Fees Threaten
Small Banks, DAILY SIGNAL (May 17, 2011), http://dailysignal.com/2011/05/17/bernanke-on-
dodd-frank-fallout-debit-card-fees-threaten-small-banks/ (stating that the proposed twelve-
cent cap on interchange fees would result in a loss of $12 billion to banks); McConnell, supra
note 25 at 651 (stating that the final rule imposing a twenty-one cent cap on interchange fees
resulted in a loss of $7.3 billion to banks). The proposed twelve-cent cap, which accounted for
only those costs that are specifically mentioned for consideration in the statute, would have
resulted in a much larger loss to banks than the loss imposed by the final rule, thus magnifying
the consequences of the final rule. See Debit Card Interchange & Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81722,
81734-35 (Dec. 28, 2010) (stating that the proposed rule only includes those costs specifically
mentioned for consideration in the statute).
264. Borak & Blackwell, supra note 152; John, supra note 152.
265. See discussion supra Part V.
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best available solution to implement the will of Congress.' 266 Another
Federal Reserve Board member was quoted saying "[w]e didn't craft the
Durbin Amendment .... We are only doing what Congress directed."267 It is
almost as if even the Federal Reserve Board recognized that the Durbin
Amendment required the type of restrictive regulation advocated for by the
merchants and retailers, but in a last-ditch effort to save the economy from
the unavoidable and dire results of such regulation, the Board found a
loophole in the statute and ran with it.
Thus, although it has been said that "[s]plitting the difference does not
improve bad policy" 26 -it seems that the Board attempted to do just that,
leaving everyone to reap the unfortunate consequences of the regulation.
However, fingers cannot be pointed at the Federal Reserve Board, because
Congress passed this ill-conceived legislation without any hearings and"mere minutes of total debate in Congress."269 Perhaps in refusing to hear the
case, the Supreme Court recognized that it could not alleviate the economic
strain caused by the Durbin Amendment, no matter which way it ruled.
Regardless, Congress unleashed the devastating Durbin Amendment, and
the floor of Congress, hopefully for more than just a few minutes this time, is
where its consequences should be addressed and the legislation reconsidered.
266. John, supra note 152.
267: Id. (quoting Sarah Bloom Raskin).
268. Id.
269. Brief for Clearing House Ass'n, L.L.C., Am. Bankers Ass'n, Consumer Bankers Ass'n,
Credit Union Nat'l Ass'n, The Fin. Serv. Roundtable, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., Mid-Size
Bank Coal. of Am., Nat'l Ass'n of Fed. Credit Unions, & Nat'l Bankers Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party and Reversal, Nat'l Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5270).
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